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a
The civil war battle that took place at Fort Pillow, Tennessee in April 1864 was a
small event militarily and strategically when compared to the rest of the American Civil
War. Immediately after the conflict occurred, however, it made the headlines of Union
newspapers like the New York Times for weeks, as Northern journalists proclaimed it to
be one of the most barbaric atrocities in the war to that point. Hundreds of Union soldiers,
mostly black freedmen, had been overwhelmed after a few hours of heavy assaults by
Confederates under the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest and had
surrendered only to be shot where they stood.
While this could have been a unique case where the influence of the Confederate
leadership swayed the better judgment of the soldiers, evidence from another very similar
battle fought by a different unit only days later, indicates that a comparable massacre
took place in which the same crimes were committed. At the battle of Poison Spring,
Arkansas, in April of 1864, the black soldiers were slaughtered just as at Fort Pillow,
during and after the battle, with little record of any provocation or supervision by the
Confederate officers. In each case, the black soldiers, who were fighting alongside white
union soldiers, were singled out and killed by Confederate troops. The massacres at Fort
Pillow and Poison Springs demonstrate, through the eyewitness accounts of soldiers and
observers from both sides, how the use of black soldiers by the Union Army inflamed the
racial hatred of many Confederate soldiers to the point that they began to use murders
and atrocities as a tactic against black soldiers and against the nearby black population to
limit their abilities through fear and intimidation.
Neither the racist influence of General Forrest nor a predisposition in Southern
society toward murdering out of racial hatred can totally account for the actions of the
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soldiers. General Forrest attracted mass amounts of attention and subsequent blame for
the atrocities from the Northern newspapers of the period, which despised his actions as a
militarily successful Confederate cavalry officer, and from historians who were interested
in his infamous association with the KKK after the war. The racial atrocities that were
committed, however, cannot simply be passed off as actions taken while under orders.
Individual confederate soldiers consciously made the choice to murder black soldiers
during and after the battles. Southern society, on the other hand, was no more racist prior
to the war than their Northem counterparts. Newspapers reported the atrocities at Fort
Pillow, not because they were especially appalled at the murder of black soldiers, but
because they were trying to demonize the actions of the Confederate soldiers, especially
the leadership.
Many historians from Northem Colleges and Universities prior to the 1960s such
as Joel Tyler Headly, who wrote just after the Civil War, took the case of Fort Pillow as
evidence of a general barbaric nature among the Confederate forces throughout the war.
Historians who opposed to this viewpoint, on the other hand, denied that any evidence
indicated that a massacre even took place. Changing viewpoints of historians writing
since the Civil War, however, demonstrate how drastically ideas and theories on black
soldiers have changed over time. In the period from the end of the war to W1y1I,
historians like W.E.B. Du Bois and William Elliot Woodward often took a strong stance
that either tried to downplay or glorifu the contributions of black soldiers in the war.
Historians who wrote after that period such as Albert Castel, and especially those writing
in the last two decades of the 20th century such as Bruce Tap and Gregory Urwin, have
reevaluated past theses and examined the influence of racial hatred among Confederate
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soldiers in how they dealt with and treated the increasing numbers of black soldiers
against whom they fought.
Just after the Civil War, there were not yet any established schools of thought on
the relevance of racially motivated massacres committed during the war and the views of
historians was heavily influenced by the thesis they were trying to support. One example
of this is Joel Headly, a historian and author of The Great Rebellion, written in 1866.
Headly does note the evidence of brutality and atrocities that occurred at Fort Pillow;
however, he supplies this information in an effort to convince his readers that the
Confederates were, in general, bloodthirsty savages. In his summation of the battle he
writes: "Neither sex, nor age, nor color was spared-everything went down before that
bloody onslaught."l He never addresses whether or not race hatred might have driven the
Confederate troops to kill the black soldiers.
Several decades after the war, two schools of thought began to emerge tended to
support views that were both extreme and directly contradictory to the other group. On
one extreme, The Black Phalazx, written by Joseph. T. Wilson in 1890, makes the claim
that there was never one case of bad conduct among all the black soldiers that served in
the Union *my.'Other historians prior to the turn of the century simply ignored the
questions about the history of black soldiers altogether. Books like A Critical History of
the Late American War,written by Asa Mahan in 1877, and Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C. Buel in 1884, both
focus on the officers that were in charge of specific units and did little research into the
experiences of the soldiers themselves.3 Neither author goes into any great detail on the
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battles of Fort Pillow or Poison Spring either as examples of Confederate brutality or
racial hatred.
From the tum of the century on through the Great Depression, the history of black
soldiers was virtually ignored until just after World War Two, when the scholarly debate
really picked up. Early 20ft Century historians either centered on the merits of deploying
black soldiers, or tried to glorifu or viliff their role just as many writers had done in the
19ft Century. One early 20th Century historian that tried to downplay the role of black
soldiers was William Elliot Woodword was writing in a period of American history when
racism and the KKK were supported by segments of the general population and even
some scholars. He wrote in 1928 that:
...the American negroes are the only people... that ever became free without any
effort of their own...They had not started the war nor ended it...They twanged
banjos around the railroad stations, sang melodious spirituals, and believed that
some Yankee would soon come along and give them forty acres and a mule.a
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, author of Black Reconstructionwhichhe
wrote in 1935, used his influence as a historian to counter the arguments of historians
who were letting racist bias influence their work. His ideas, however, were fairly extreme
in that he argued that black solders overcame the hatred of the Confederates and extreme
racism within their own army but were still the most influential factor in a Union
victory.5 His research on the Fort Pillow case centers on the massacres of the black
soldiers, but doesn't even mention the fact that white Union soldiers were killed at the
same time.
In the late 1950's and 1960's, though, a large change occurred in black history as
many historians began to make more of an effort to keep their own bias and the ideas of
others from affecting their work. Most historians wdting during this time were less
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preconditioned towards either side of the previous debate and instead began to take a look
at the history of the individual soldiers. In 1958, Albert Castel, a historian who
researched Fort Pillow, wrote an article critiquing historians and writers from both the
'Northern" and "southern" views, especially the biographers of Forrest, arguing they
allowed "prejudice and errors" to affect their work, making neither side completely
wrong or right.6 The article attempted to establish that there was in fact amassacre at Fort
Pillow that included many atrocities, some of which were racially motivated. Castel's
work on Fort Pillow was aimed primarily at dispelling a multitude of myths. Other
historians argued for example that the battle was more than just a lopsided victory, and
kept focusing on this idea rather than the issue of racial hatred.
John Cimprich and Robert C. Mairtfort, were two historians that re-examined the
Fort Pillow controversy in the early 1980s and published an article challenging a school
of interpretation they labeled "southern writers" including those who defended the
actions of General Forrest. Cimprich and Mainfort concluded, "the Confederate's racial
antagonisms, possibly inflamed by the black troops behavior [they were vocally taunting
the Confederates], greatly affected the incidents."T Their analysis, however, didn't really
add anything beyond Castel's. Their work did include, however, several pages of letters
that soldiers from both sides of the battle wrote between several days and a few weeks
after the massacre.
The historiography debate shifted during the 1990s, from discussions of how the
battles took place and whether or not they were massacres to discussions of how the
massacres fit into the history of the Civil War. Cimprich and Mainfort contributed a
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second article in 1989 that provided significant statistical evidence to support the
massacre thesis, with a focus on the racist atrocities and motives of those actions.s
Historians of the 1990s and the early 20s century have worked hard to establish
that there was indeed a massacre of Union soldiers, most of whom were black, at Fort
Pillow and at Poison Spring, and have argued that racial hatred was a influence. Few,
however, have that racially motivated killings were a tactic of Confederate soldiers who
were trying to intimidate both the black union troops and the Freedmen. Historians such
as Bruce Tap and Gregory Urwin, however, did make arguments that supported this idea
and also further examined the motives behind the actions of the Confederate soldiers and
officers involved in the massacres and the agendas behind the reactions, or the lack of, by
politicians and reporters of the period. Tap and Urwin published two articles within the
last four years (both in 1996) that went beyond the latest research by Cimprich and
Mainfort. Tap examined Union critiques of Southem society and the Fort Pillow
controversy in relation to the War Crimes Committee, a group formed by the Federal
Government in response to the Fort Pillow massacre that was given the duty of
investigating war crimes throughout the rest of the ware. Urwin focused his work on
examining the Poison Springs massacre in relation to aspects of racism in the
Confederacy.
Fort Pillow is a well-documented example of a racially motivated massacre that
historians have scrutinized more closely than Poison Spring, but the battle started out like
many others. The crudely built fort was a federal garrison that was positioned on a bluff
overlooking the Mississippi River. It consisted mainly of a large ditch in the shape of a
half moon backed up against the river, 125 meters in diameter, surrounding an earthen
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parapet about eight feet high and the troops inside were protected by large ditches and
mounds of dirt.lo The New York Times described the report as "an isolated outpost, of no
value whatsoever to the defense of Columbus, and utterly untenable by the rebels."ll
Stationed inside wereZg2troops from the 6ft Colored Heavy Artillery and 285 white
troops from the 13ft Tennessee Cavalry under the command of Major L. F. Booth.
The attacking Confederates, under the command of General Nathan Bedford
Forrest, numbered over 1500 soldiers who had never faced black troops in combat.
Forrest had already gained a reputation with Northern newspaper writers who closely
followed his movements in order to find information that would build up his image as a
notorious Confederate Cavalry officer. The main mission of Forrest's troops was to
conduct hit and run attacks and raids against small Union units and supply trains in the
area. According to a January l2th summation of Forrest's raids inThe New York Times,
the Confederates had already conducted successful raids throughout Tennessee with the
lst Brigade Cavalry and Sixteenth Army Corps in hot pursuit. The Times reported that
"Forrest, with less than 4000 men, has moved right through the Sixteenth army corps- has
passed within miles of Memphis- carried off over 100 wagons, 200 beef cattle, 3,000
conscripts and innumerable stores."l2 By the time the Confederate Army arrived at Fort
Pillow in April, Forrest's unit had been fighting the Union Army in Tennessee for several
months and was well known to Northern reporters and the public.
When the Confederate forces arrived at Fort Pillow, Forrest approached the Fort
under a flag of truce and asked the Union commander to surrender his forces. At the same
time, the Confederate soldiers began to prepare for an assault and when the discussion
between the Generals failed to produce results, the Confederate forces attacked and
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quickly overwhelmed the fort. The New York Times reported on the story several times in
the weeks after the battle, posting the battle to the front page three times. The April 20
edition described the engagement from the viewpoints of "authentic sources:"
The rebels, under Forrest, appeared and drove in the pickets about sunrise on
Tuesday morning...The garrison in the two outer forts were at length
overpowered by superior numbers, and about noon evacuated them and retired to
the fort on the river. Here the fight was maintained with great obstinacy, and
continued till about 4 p.m...Here the rebels organized for a final charge upon the
fort, after sending a flag of truce, with a demand for surrender, which was
refused.l3
The start of the battle is similar to that of many other lopsided victories that took
place during the war. After the Union troops began to surrender and flee the scene,
however, the actions that followed distinguished the attack from most others. The
Confederates quickly began to round up and kill as many of the Union solders as they
could find. Most were killed while trying to surrender or flee the battlefield. The April
20th New York Times continued to describe the chaotic situation and massacres that
ensued:
[The union soldiers] did not falter nor flinch until at the last charge, when it was
evident they would be overpowered, they broke and fled towards the river, and
here commenced the most barbarous and cruel outrages that ever the fiendishness
of rebels have perpetrated during the war...The colored soldiers threw down there
guns and raised their arms in token of surrender, but not the least attention was
paid to it. They continued to shoot down all they found. A number of them
finding no quarter was given, ran over the bluff to the river, and tried to conceal
themselves...were pursued by the rebel savages...they were all shot down in cold
blood and in full sight of the gunboat, chased and shot them down as they would
dogs. One had crawled into a hollow log and was killed in it.. . Several had tried to
hide in crevices made by the falling bank...but they were singled out and killed.ra
The log of the Union gunboat stationed in the river that the New York Times refers
to, the No. 7, also provided a description of the scene. The officer in charge reported that
they "got underway and while standing over towards the Fort [. The] colors were lowered
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and an indiscriminate massacre was commenced on our troops, the enemy firing volley
after volley into them while unable to resist at the same time turning their fire on us."15
The Confederate soldiers themselves, however, provide some of the strongest
evidence supporting the theory that a massacre took place. They were often very candid
and emotional when describing the event to family and friends in letters and in diaries.
'oThe poor deluded negroes would run up to our men fall upon their knees and with
uplifted arms scream for mercy but were ordered to their feet and then shot down," Sgt.
Achilles V. Clark, wrote, "Their fort turned out to be a great slaughter petr,"l6 The most
descriptive and bloody account, however, comes from an unidentified soldier writing a
family member a few days after the battle:
Then the work of slaughter and death commenced. The sight of Negro soldiers
stirred the bosoms of our soldiers with courageous madness...The sight was
terrific, the slaughter was sickening. Wearied with the slow process of shooting
our guns, our troops commenced with our repeaters, and every fire brought down
a foe, and so close was the fight, that the dead would frequently fall upon the
soldier that killed....hundreds were killed in the water endeavoring to escape. The
number in the water was so great that they resembled a drove of hogs swimming
across the stream...The Mississippi River was crimsoned with the red blood of
the flying foe. Our soldiers grew sick_and weary in the work of the slaughter, and
were glad when the work was done."
The most unique feature of this battle was not the large number of casualties or
even that a massacre had taken place, it was the fact that black soldiers were intentionally
targeted by the Confederate soldiers during and after the battle. Even though the Union
forces were almost equally divided between white and black soldiers, Black troops
suffered a casualty rate double that of the white troops, 66 percent as opposed to 33
percent.ls They were not, however, at any more of a disadvantage, strategically, than any
of the white troops beside whom they fought. They were in the same fort and were using
the same weapons as the other union troops. The difference was simply that many
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Confederate troops refused to take black Union soldiers prisoner, and instead, shot them
as they tried or surrender or run.
The official report of Brigadier-General Augustus L. Chetlain, the officer in
charge of the headquarters of Black units in Tennessee, is one of many sources that
described the massacre and murder of the black soldiers. It states that,'oAfter the capture
our colored men were literally butchered. Chalmers [Brigidier General James R.
Chalmers, the Confederate General who was second in command] was present and saw it
all. Out of over 300 colored men, not25 were taken prisoners, and they may have been
killed long ago."le
The April l8 edition of the New YorkTimes also reported the overtones of the
racial atrocities, observing, 'oThree other negroes were buried alive by the rebels at Fort
Pillow, making five in all. All were wounded but one. He was forced to help dig the pits,
and was then thrown in and covered up."20 Many of the people who had been part of the
burial detail after the battle also reported seeing evidence of Union soldiers who had been
nailed to the floor of the hospital before it was set ablaze by the rebels.2rlieutenant
William Clary later testified that he saw, "five Negroes buming...It seemed to me as if
the fire could not have been set more than a half an hour before. Their flesh frying off
them, and their clothes were burnirrg."z2
Union solders who survived the battle recalled that, not only were the black
soldiers killed because of their race, but the white soldiers who fought alongside them
were also killed simply because they had been supporting black soldiers. One white
Union soldier of the l3th Tennessee recalled hearing a Confederate soldier exclaim, "God
damn you, you fight with the niggers, and we will kill every last one of you."23 Another
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remembered hearing, o'I have nothing for you fellows; you Tennesseans pretend to be
men, and you fight side by side with niggers; I have nothing for you."24
The evidence suggests that the Confederates were especially enraged about Union
soldiers using black troops who they perceived as an unfair advantage that southemers
themselves couldn't risk using. The ahocities were not only crimes of murder; they were
also racially motivated crimes of hared towards black soldiers who supported the Union.
The racially motivated murders, however, were not limited to soldiers and the
congressional committee that was sent to report on the war crimes concluded that several
black women and children were also killed at Fort Pillow or in the vicinity just after the
attack.25
In the weeks that followed the battle at Fort Pillow, many Confederate soldiers
involved in the massacre continued to write about the event and talked about it openly in
the streets. The only newspaper reporters on the scene were those from Southern cities
who had been following General Forrest but even they were willing to report that, "Thus
the whites received quarter, but the Negroes were shown no mercy."26Instead of
reporting the event as an atrocity committed during war, however, Southern newspapers
used it as an example to gain support for the war effort. The Richmond Examiner argued:
"Repeat Fort Pillow... and we shall bring the Yankees to their senses, and, what is even
better, our govemment will rise to a proper sense of its position as an organ of a
rration."21 The massacres were not only justifiable the editors argued, they were the kind
of tactics that they thought would win the war.
By mid May, however, the tone of the Southem media had shifted to denial as
Union outrage began to build support for the ongoing critique of Southern society and
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supported calls for "retaliation." Some Republicans had began to call for retribution of
some sort, and the Indianapolis Daily Journal even stated,"Letthe fate of the Fort Pillow
prisoners overtake a like number of Rebel prisoners in our hands, and their blood be upon
the heads of the Fort pillow butchers."28 The Chicago Tribune added, "Retaliation in kind
is the only medicine to soothe the fearful memories of Fort of Pillow."2e Afterward,
Lincoln stated: "If there has been a massacre...and so proven, retribution shall as surely
come.,'3o Senator Howard of Michigan even drafted a resolution directing the Committee
on the Conduct of the War to do an on-site investigation. "Without this protection we
know full well what will be the fate of black troops whom we call into our service."3l
Northern Newspaper reporters began using Fort Pillow as a critique of the Confederate
Army, especially its leadershiP.
Forrest wrote a report soon after the battle claiming that the high casualty rate at
Fort pillow was caused only by the Union soldiers' refusal to lay down a*r.3'In public,
he denied any claims that a massacre, racially motivated or otherwise, had even taken
place at Fort Pillow. After union reports re-defined the engagement as a massacre, a word
that suggested outrage and fed the fires of larger debates, the Confederacy's attitudes
toward the battle quickly changed, and they began to refute the evidence of a massacre.
Some historians later continued the strategy of denial for decades to come'
The atrocities at Fort Pillow could possibly be explained as a case of honor of
honor-bound Confederate soldiers carrying out the orders of General Forrest, as some
Confederate soldiers claimed, but there is little evidence of any official orders of "no
quarter."33 Cimprich and Mainfort also observe, for example, that, "any Confederate
soldier could have used Forrest's name without authorization in the heat of the
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moment."3a Several soldiers reportedly used the phase 
oogive no quarter" as a rallying cry
during the assault on the fort, but it is still unclear whether or not Forrest ever gave such
an order.3s There might well have been some leaders in the Confederacy who espoused
killing black soldiers rather than taking them captive. However, this could only have
acted as a spark that initiated the killings. It was still up to individual soldiers to decide
what actions they would take during battle. Since Forrest was the commander in charge
of the Confederate soldiers, he is still responsible for all of their actions and will always
carry the blame for the murders that took place. The individual soldiers also share the
blame, however, and any defense that they were simply following orders cannot take at
least partial responsibility for the murders off of their shoulders.
The battle at Poison Spring is an example of a similar event where Confederate
troops massacred black soldiers without any evidence of orders to do so from
Confederate leadership. The battle took place on April 18, 1864 shortly after Fort Pillow,
and involved twice as many soldiers, but it was not nearly so well known or well covered
in Northem newspapers of the time.36 The Confederate troops at Poison Spring were not
under the command of a well known Confederate General, such as Forrest, and the story
simply didn't carry the weight among the Northem reporters as Fort Pillow did. As a
consequence, the massacre of Poison Spring only received a slight mention inthe New
York Times.
The 1,170 Union troops involved at Poison Springs came from the 14,000 soldiers
of the Union Army Seventh Corps who started out of Little Rock and Fort Smith several
days earlier under the command of Major General Frederick Steel on orders to link up
with Union Gunboats in Louisiana. Steel sent out 438 soldiers from the I't Kansas
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Colored Infantry, 383 from the 18th Iowa,29l from the2'd,6ft, and 14th Cavalry, and 58
soldiers from the artillery on an expedition to gather com from a nearby storage point.
The Union troops, loaded with supplies from raids they had conducted in the Arkansas
countryside, eventually met with 3,600 Confederate Cavalrymen under the command of
General John S. Marmaduke who had maneuvered to position his troops for battle at
Poison Springs.
The Confederate forces consisted of 1,500 Misourians, 1,500 soldiers from
Arkansas, 655 Texans, and 680 Choctaw Indians. Unlike Forrest, Marmaduke had not yet
established any notorious image for his military campaigning nor did he later have any
significant association with the KKK after the war that later drew the attention of
historians looking to draw conclusions between the Klan and the previous actions of high
ranking Confederate leaders.
The Union troops at Poison Spring fell back into a hasty defense around the head
of the supply train upon encountering the Confederate soldiers, but they were quickly
surrounded on three sides by Confederate infantry, dismounted cavalry, and 12 artillery
pieces. The Confederates broke the Union lines after the third assault on their position,
and the Union soldiers fought a running battle while retreating back through their own
supply wagons. The killing, however, didn't stop after all the Union soldiers who could
retreat had done so. Many of the Union soldiers who were left were put to death by the
Confederates immediately as they tried to surrender.
The officer in charge of one of the Union units later stated, "N{any wounded men
of the 1st Kansas Colored Volunteers fell into the hands of the enemy, and I have the
most positive assurances from eyewitnesses that they were murdered on the spot."37 Just
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as at Fort Pillow, the Confederate soldiers also spoke very openly at first about the
massacres. When the Commander of the Trans-Mississippian Department of the
Confederacy, General Edmund Kirby Smith, reached the nearby city of Camden,
Confederate troops there informed him that the Union soldiers who died at Poison Spring
were, "primarly Negroes who neither gave or rec'[eived] quarter."38
Even wounded black soldiers lying on the ground were vulnerable to the racial
hatred of the rebels. Confederate soldiers tasked with taking away the captured wagons
and supplies held competitions to see who could crush more wounded black soldiers
beneath the wheels of their wagons.3e Wounded soldiers on the battlefield reported
hearing Confederate soldiers bayoneting the wounded blacks and chanting, "Where is the
First Kansas Nigger now?" The other Confederates replied, "All cut to pieces and gone to
hell by bad management."4O These last two examples show that the actions of the
Confederate soldiers went beyond simply following orders and could hardly be explained
by the influence of the Confederate leadership. The individual soldiers made the choice to
deliberately kill the black soldiers after the fighting had ceased.
The Confederates were extremely prejudicial in deciding which soldiers to kill at
Poison Spring. According to historian Gregory Urwin, the carnage that followed revealed
"the essence of a savage conflict whose central issue was race."4l The ltt Kansas, the unit
composed of black soldiers, lost I l7 soldiers but came away with only 65 wounded; a
ratio of killed to wounded that was unusual and the inverse of typical ratios for most
other Civil War battles.o'One explanation for this point comes from the 2'd Cavalry
soldiers who escaped. According to one soldier,
It will be seen that the number of our killed exceeds the number of our wounded
in this engagement, an unusual occurrence in warfare of the present day, as it is
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generally found from the reports of the many battles being daily fought in our
land, to be just the contrary. This can be accounted for when it is known.. . the
inhuman and blood thirsty enemy...was engaged in killing the wounded wherever
found.a3
While the confederate soldiers might simply have been enraged by the sight of
Union troops plundering their territory, the fact that the black troops were almost
exclusively singled out for revenge suggests that there was much more involved. The
black soldiers of the l't and 2nd Kansas were a fairly small part of the units taking part in
the foraging raids and southem civilians actually commended them for their behavior and
actions during this period. One black regiment was even spotted protecting a southern
doctor's home from white looters who had been following the path of the Arrny.oo
These battles were just two examples of many instances of racial atrocities
committed during the Civil War. Only five days after the massacre at Poison Springs,
General Steel sent another supply expedition on a similar mission to a place called
Mark's Mills. Again, the Confederates attacked the 1,200 Union soldiers and annihilated
the column, taking over one thousand prisoners. A Confederate Major admitted after the
war that "The battle field was sickening to behold...No orders, threats, or commands
could restrain the men from vengeance on the negroes, and they were piled in great heaps
about the wagons, in the tangled brushwood, and upon the muddy and trampled road."45
While the Union army gathering supplies through the countryside might well have
enraged the Confederate soldiers, they once again singled out black soldiers and civilians
to annihilate.
Primary evidence from witnesses and the Committee on the Conduct on the
Conduct of the War suggests that the Confederate troops at Fort Pillow and Poison
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Springs were also guilty of murdering black civilians who were near the Union Army. A
Union officer later walked the battlefield at Poison Spring and stated, "The number of
Negroes I could not get... I saw perhaps near 30, and the Rebs pointed out to me a point
of woods where they told me they had killed eighty odd negroes men women and
children..."46 One soldier from the 36ft Iowa reported: 'oThere was not an armed negro
with us [at Mark's Mills] and they shot down our Colored servants and teamsters and
others what were following us..."47 These women, children, and servants, had little, if
any, military value to the Union Army. Yet they were murdered in cold blood; possibly
simply for the intimidation value that the Confederate soldiers thought it had on the black
soldiers fighting for the Union Army.
Fort Pillow was not simply a garrison with black soldiers; it was also a major
center for recruiting freedmen into the Union At*y.o* The black soldiers at Poison Spring
were not simply riding through the countryside raiding southern stores and supplies; they
were also recruiting black freedmen from plantations that had been overtaken. Many
Confederate soldiers began to use murders of blacks, including women and children, who
tried to support the Union as a method of intimidation. By reducing the ability of the
Union Army to have those people and use them, it limited the support that blacks could
or were willing to give the Union army. The other benefit for the Confederacy, however,
would be for the Black soldiers to become convinced that risking the lives of themselves
and their family by fighting the Union was simply not worth it. Thus, the Confederates
would reduce the number of soldiers that the Union had.
The use of freedmen as soldiers in the Union Army not only inflamed the racist
attitudes of many Confederates; it was also a major advantage (over 180,000 black men
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joined the Union Army by the wars end) that Southerners could not repeat without
fundamental changes in their society. Many believed that if slaves were given their
freedom [such as an Army of Black men] and "if ever those bonds should slip, he would
revert to his animal nature and attempt to kill every white person he came across."4e John
Eaton declared, "the crime of Lincoln in seducing our slaves into the ranks of his army"
ranks o'amongst those stupendous wrongs against humanity, shocking to the moral sense
of the world, like Herod's massacre of the Innocents, or the eve of St. Bartholomew."So
The head of the Confederate Bureau of War declared, "The enlistment of our slaves is a
barbarity. No people...could tolerate...the use of savages [against them]."s1 At a time
when the Confederacy was desperately short on manpower, the Union was drawing from
a resource that the Confederacy had, but still couldn't fully use as soldiers.
While many of the officers of the Confederate Army such as General B. A.
Hichcock talked openly of not allowing black soldiers or white officers of black soldiers
to be taken prisoner, the atrocities at Poison Spring and Fort Pillow cannot simply be
attributed to the orders handed down by the leadership. Hichcock, wrote a letter to the
New York Times in 1864 stating that, "The Yankees are not going to send the Negro
troops in the field- they know as well as we do that no reliance can be placed on
them. .. Should they be sent to the field, and be sent in battle, none will be taken
prisoner-our troops understand what to do in such cases. If any Negroes have been
captured during the war, as soldiers in the enemy's ranks, we have not heard of them."52
There never actually was any official policy of the Confederacy's Congress
stating that all black soldiers were to be killed rather than taken prisoner. The closest
mention on the subject was a joint resolution stipulating,"that white commissioned
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officers of colored troops when captured should be put to death or other-wise punished at
the discretion of the military court before which they are tried."53 The Confederate
Congress, prior to l864,had little to say on the issue of what to do with black prisoners.
That year, however, the Congress authorized capture of black prisoners simply because
they could then be resold as slaves to help the war effort.5a One controversy that was
never resolved, however, was the exchange of prisoners. The Confederacy refused to
allow a black soldier to be traded for a white soldier because they claimed it degraded
their soldiers.ss
Hichcock's soldiers, however, had already decided what course to take, as he
claimed in his letter to the New York Times in which he states that, 
o'out troops
understand what to do in such cases." He is essentially arguing that there was never
actually any need for the Confederacy to tell its soldiers to kill the blacks; it was
something that the soldiers themselves had already known and decided for themselves. It
is interesting to note, however, that by 1864, the Confederacy was, arguably, loosing the
war and the thought of shifting blame may have crossed Hichcock's mind.
While historians scrutinizing Fort Pillow because of General Forrest's role, the
same outcome may well have resulted if any other Confederate General had been leading
the attack on that day. Historians have found little evidence pinning the blame for the
massacre of black soldiers specifically on Forrest. Any one of his subordinates could
have issued the order, or the soldiers may have reached a common understanding ahead
of time, or they may simply have released their anger that built up, transformed into
racial hatred, and emerged in a murderous rage directed against the black soldiers. The
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point being, it did not take the persuasion of a great orator. The massacre was an action
carried out by the individuals who participated.
On the other hand, Northern society was just as racist during the nineteenth
century as most of the southemers were. Southem society and its soldiers, prior to the
war, were not simply predisposed towards murdering out of racial hatred, any more than
their northern counterparts. The fact that most Northern states prohibited slavery, and
some Northemers wanted it abolished, did not, in any way, mean that Northerners did not
harbor just as much hatred as Southemers towards blacks. Historian Don Fehrenbacher
argues that, "the North and South, while bitterly at odds on the issue of slavery, were
relatively close to one another in their attitudes towards race."56 Another historian,
Ronald Takaki, explains that,
The North was not the promised land for blacks. Racism was both virulent and
violent in the states above the Mason and Dixon Line during the years before the
Civil War.. .. For many Northern whites, the black seemed unable to develop
beyond childhood-the period before adult responsibilities and work...Whites
believed his 'understanding' was 'weak,' and were inclined to look upon him as
'a being intermediate between man and the brutes.'s7
Prominent and influential Northem leaders were very open about their racist
views. Many Northemers stuck to the idea that blacks were a "child/savage" race
incapable of performing all but the simplest tasks. One Indiana Senator even declared in
1850 that: "The same power that has given him a black skin, with less weight or volume
of brain has given us a white skin, with greater volume of brain and intellect."ss Many
Northem Republicans were against the spread of slavery, not because they viewed it as
injustice to the blacks, but because they supported racial separation and feared racial
intermarriage or even working alongside blacks.se
2t
Even President Lincoln, called the "great Emancipator by historians and writers
up to this day, exhibited prejudice. Historian Roy P. Basler included a speech in volume
III of The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (1953-55) in which Lincoln stated that he
had
ever been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of
the white and black races...there is a physical difference between the white and
black races which I believe will for ever forbid the two races living together...and
I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned
to the white ru"L.uo
Many medical doctors and biologists of the period also seemed to support this
way of thinking. The bookCrania Americana, published in 1839, stated that the cranial
capacities of blacks were much smaller than that of whites and they were thus mentally
inferior.6r In the bookNojoque: A Questionfor a Continenf, authored by Hinton R.
Helper in 1867, the author summed up a Northem viewpoint of blacks: "See the night-
bom ogre, low receding forehead; his broad depressed nose; his stammering speech."62
The attack and atrocities at Fort Pillow made headlines in northem newspapers
because it became useful to many leaders of the Union, not because it was a great
strategic loss or because they were concerned for the loss of black soldiers. A letter to the
editor in the April 18, 1864 edition of the New York Times is a good example of this. The
reader wrote in, in response to an article that described the circumstances around the
release of an officer, who had been in command of a black unit (Corps d' Afrique), from
the Libby prison in Richmond. The letter pointed out that while the paper rejoiced at the
release of the white offrcer, it only hinted at the fact that the black soldiers who served
under him were all hanged at the prison, and the Federal Army had done little to try and
retrieve them.63
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Fort Pillow was the type of example many Radical Republicans had sought as a
mechanism for dismantling and reconstructing Southern society. While the war wasn't
started with the purpose of reforming the south,by 1864, Union leaders were already
trying to decide how to reconstruct the region after the war was over. Many Union
leaders, especially Radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens, saw southern society as
an inefficient, backwards, anti-bourgeois system that was in need of reform. Acts of
massacres and atrocities, especially those that could be linked to well-known leaders of
the Confederacy, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, could be used to attack the southern
leadership, slavery, and the society itself. According to historian Bruce Tap, many in the
Union believed that the South was "indeed a backward, impoverished society in need of
fundamental reconstruction," and the massacre at Fort Pillow confirmed their beliefs.fl
After the massacre at Fort Pillow, the Chicago Tribune printed the statement "in no
respects does the act misrepresent the nature and precedents of Slavery."65 The Christian
Advocate believed, "the atrocities were 'unparalleled in the history of warfare.' But, the
paper added, it was slavery that prompted such atrocities; it not for it, the Confederates
'would act like Gentlemen instead of tigers'."66
Many within the Union actively constructed the notion of Southern resentment
and the need for violent "purification" of a society that had descended into 
o'barbarism".
Abolitionists and Radical Republicans were still a minority within the Republican Party,
and many Northern moderates were more interested in linking their region to the
economic possibilities of the West. The Northerners who were strong criticizers of
Southern society, however, were already a powerful influence in establishing the future
agenda for reconstruction. George Julian remarked in 1864 that, "We are summoned by
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every consideration of patriotism, humanity, and Republicanism to lay the foundation of
empire upon the enduring foundation ofjustice and equal rights."67 Julian, and others like
him, were looking for a way to further their hope of redesigning Southern society in their
own image, and the Massacres at Fort Pillow helped them gather support.
The purpose of the Committee on the Conduct of the War's investigation, just
after Fort Pillow, was more than simply investigating racial atrocities. Historian Bruce
Tap concludes: "Since the atrocities revealed in these investigations were viewed by
many in the North as a logical outcome of a hierarchic, slave society, the committee [on
the Conduct of the Warl hoped that the exposure of Rebel barbarities would help lay the
foundation for a comprehensive reconstruction program."68
The Confederate leadership stressed the idea that the very foundation of their
society was being attacked. Even though a majority of southemers didn't own slaves,
they were still willing to fight in order to hold their position or class status in society and
rallied around this noble cause. Prior to the war, the average southemer had just as much,
or more, contact, be it positive or negative, with blacks as their northem counterparts.
Many parts of American society during the nineteenth century were racist, but racism was
not elevated to the point were most Confederate soldiers at the beginning of the war were
ready to commit horrible atrocities against blacks. A Richmond newspaper stated in
1864, "It is a deadly stab which they are driving at our institutions themselves, because
they know that if we were to yield on this point, to treat black men as the equals of white,
and insurgent slaves as equivalent to our brave soldiers, the very foundation of slavery
would be fatally wounded."6e
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Slavery southemers argued, was actually a "positive good" in the South. John C.
Calhoun had even claimed in 1838, "Many in the South once believed that slavery was a
moral and political evil. That folly and delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light,
and regard it as the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world."7o The
Confederates saw themselves as defending their society against the power and comrption
and encroachment of the a system of "wage slavery" where, "Tender women, aged men,
delicate, children, toil and labor from early dawn until after candle light, from one year to
another, for a miserable pittance, scarcely above starvation point and without hope of
amelioration."Tl Many people were willing to do whatever it took, including massacres
of a class of people they already had decided was lower than themselves, as long as they
thought they were defending their states against a comrpt system of wage slavery like the
one they believed existed in the industrial North.
The debate on the events at Fort Pillow and Poison Springs has changed
dramatically since the Civil War. Historians writing at the end of the 20th century such as
John Cimprich and Robert Mainfort, have focused on the issues of racial hatred at Fort
Pillow rather than simply using the battle to either debase Southern Society or the black
soldiers in the Union Army as many historians prior to WWII had attempted to do. Using
the evidence of a massacre for the purpose of supporting another agenda, however, was
even more common among Northern Republicans and the Press than it ever was with
historians. Reporters and politicians closely followed Fort Pillow not because they were
concerned for the fate of the black soldiers, but because of the added political value that
the already notorious General Forrest gave to the battle. The atrocities that were
committed, however, cannot simply be attributed to the power and influence that that
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leaders like Forrest had, nor can it be said that the Confederate soldiers were simply
following orders. The massacres at Fort Pillow and Poison Spring are examples of the
emergence of racially and politically motivated murders that were more than killings that
occurred in the heat of battle; they were instead intentionally carried out and calculated
murders designed to intimidate the black union soldiers and the civilians that supported
them. Prior to the war, southern society was n@more racist or predisposition than the
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